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Anti-exceptionalism about logic denies that our logical theories and our
choice thereof have any special epistemic character. In particular, however we
should go about choosing a logical theory, it will be analogous to how we choose
other non-logical theories. This view originates with Quine (1970) and Good-
man (1983) and has become increasingly common as a picture of the status of
logic.1 It promises to resolve deep issues about how to discriminate between
alternative options for our background logic; that is, our most general canons
of implication. But promise is one thing, ability another; I’ll suggest here some
limitations of this approach to logical revision.
I’ll start by distinguishing two ways of developing anti-exceptionalist ap-
proaches to logical revision. The first emphasizes comparing the theoretical
virtuousness of developed bodies of logical theories, such as classical and in-
tuitionistic logic. I’ll call this whole theory comparison. The second attempts
local repairs to problematic bits of our logical theories, such as dropping ex-
cluded middle (and modifying elsewhere accordingly) to deal with intuitions
about vagueness. I’ll call this the piecemeal approach.
I’ll then briefly discuss a problem I’ve developed elsewhere for comparisons
of logical theories. Essentially, the problem is that a pair of logics may each eval-
uate the alternative as superior to themselves, resulting in oscillation between
logical options. The piecemeal approach offers an way out of this problem and
thereby might seem a preferable to whole theory comparisons. I’ll go on to
show that reflective equilibrium, the best known piecemeal method, has deep
∗Thanks to Liam Kofi Bright, Edd Elliot, Daniel Elstein, Ole Hjortland, Beau Madison
Mount, Erum Naqvi, Carlo Nicolai, Graham Priest, Gillian Russell, Gil Sagi, Dan Waxman,
Robbie Williams, and Timothy Williamson for helpful discussion of these issues. Thanks to
the Centre for Metaphysics and Mind at Leeds for providing useful feedback for an earlier
version. And thanks to my comprehensive exam examiners—John Burgess, Tom Kelly, Boris
Kment, and the sadly departed Delia Graff Fara—who heard an extremely early version of
this work many years ago.
1Recent sophisticated articulations include Otavio Bueno and Mark Colyvan (2004), Ole
Hjortland (2017), Graham Priest (2006, 2016), Michael Resnik (1997), Gillian Russell (2013,
2015), and Timothy Williamson (2014, 2015).
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problems of its own when applied to logic (by developing a problem suggested
by Wright 1986).
The problem developed isn’t unique to reflective equilibrium, but affects
any piecemeal method which both (a) allows significant freedom in how to re-
vise and (b) uses a logical theory to assess the reasonableness of various repairs.
(a) and (b) together yield a far too permissive account of logical revision. Such
approaches thereby require some kind of guidance to separate out good repairs
from bad ones. However, it’s unclear how to add this guidance in an epistemi-
cally satisfactory way without abandoning the anti-exceptionalist standpoint.
I’ll close by suggesting that the best version of the piecemeal method of
revision makes use of multiple theoretical virtues and, moreover, adopts a
constraint—logical partisanhood—which was originally motivated for whole
theory comparisons (Woods forthcoming-a). The upshot of my discussion is that
• piecemeal revision of our logical theories, especially in its reflective equi-
librium guise, suffers from distinctive problems,
• solving these problems requires epistemically significant guidance, but it’s
difficult to do so without abandoning anti-exceptionalism,
• the best way resolving these problems requires significant constraint, so
much so that the resulting account is not really recognizable as a form of
reflective equilibrium.
The argument and discussion that follows will be kept slightly informal to avoid
complication and theoretical commitments not essential to the overall point.
0.1 Rules of the Game
A few reasonable presumptions frame my discussion. First, I assume that anti-
exceptionalist views of logical theory choice are really about which logic to adopt
as our most basic canon of legitimate deductive implication. This is because
deciding which particular logics to adopt for instrumental purposes poses no
interesting philosophical difficulties. We can always treat these advantages as
features of using a particular formal method, like relevance logic, in a particular
context without abandoning the governing role of our (roughly classical) back-
ground canons of implication.2
Certain familiar arguments mustered in favor of logical deviance, like the use-
fulness of linear logic in tracking resource use or the usefulness of relevance logic
in analyzing informational content, are thereby shown to be undercooked.3 We
2And, as I’ve argued (forthcoming-a), certain nice advantages of strongly deviant logic can,
as yet, only be seen from the viewpoint of our background canons of implication.
3See Shapiro (2014) for a useful survey of applications of this type. Shapiro himself ques-
tions the coherence of a single background canon of deductive implication, but there’s no
space to engage with his arguments for that conclusion here.
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need an additional reason to think that the explanation just offered—in terms
of situation-specific reasoning—isn’t sufficient to account for the supposed ad-
vantage. I doubt that such a reason will be forthcoming, but regardless there
remain interesting questions about logical revision which focus explicitly on our
most general canons of implication. It’s these questions, like which logic we
should take as our background logic in which to evaluate logical relations be-
tween propositions, that I focus on.
Second, anti-exceptionalist methodology aims to provide us with the ability
to justify this or that logical revision. In carrying it out we thereby need to look
for reasons we’re in a position to use in providing justifications. Procedures of
idealization which are available in other areas aren’t clearly available since what
counts as an idealization itself involves implication (see §0.4.1). Similarly, evi-
dentialist ways of cashing out notions of epistemic reasons also take for granted
a fixed background logic since they employ notions like ‘independent evidence’
which are explicated using an implication relation. There simply isn’t a theory-
neutral stance from which to make sense of reasons we’re not able to make use
of in justifying a case for revision.
This situation places important “dialectical”, “internalist”, “basing”-looking
constraints on the methodology that become important below. Reasons which
can be generated from some logical resources distinct from our own are thus un-
available (see §0.4.1 and (Woods forthcoming-a) for more detailed discussion.)4
0.2 Two Methodologies for Logical Revision
Anti-exceptionalist methodology comes in two rough forms. First, some treat
evaluation of our logical options much like we treat evaluation of whole scien-
tific theories more generally. This involves evaluating whole bodies of developed
logical theory according to various criteria of theoretical goodness. Call this
whole-theory comparison. Others treat evaluation of our logical options more
piecemeal, employing methodologies like wide reflective equilibrium (Goodman
1953) in developing and justifying our logical commitments.
The advantages of whole-theory comparison in actual use is that we know
quite a bit about the various alternatives before comparing them. To be even
eligible for comparison in this way, a certain amount of preparatory work needs
to be done. Moreover, typical alternatives are more or less natural and guided
by some background idea. This means that the packages tend not to be logical
frankensteins. There are, of course, exceptions.
The advantage of the piecemeal methodology in actual use is its ability to
innovate, determining by means of a series of tweaks an overall theory cut to fit
4I write in this slightly elliptical way since “possessing” beliefs or knowledge that would
suffice for justification is tricky when our fundamental logical resources are up for grabs. What
I have in mind should nevertheless be clear.
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the data. Yet it works more blindly since the consequences of various tweaks
are often not at all obvious. Moreover, the resulting series of tweaks can look
quite frankensteinian.
Of course, the methods are related and, in fact, from a certain remove one
can see the piecemeal approach as a sequence of whole-theory comparisons of
underdeveloped theories. Nonetheless, it’s important to separate them here.
Separating them makes it clearer that piecemeal methodology—at least when
explicated in certain ways—has even more problems that whole-theory compar-
isons.
Why might we be tempted by the piecemeal approach? One reason is be-
cause of standing problems with whole-theory comparisons. I’ve explored these
problems elsewhere, arguing that whole-theory comparison needs to be signif-
icantly constrained in order to play the role many have suggested it should
(Woods forthcoming-a). Let me explain.
Evaluation of our logical alternatives, in terms of their theoretical goodness,
makes use of logic. We should use the logic we currently endorse—our working
logic—in order to evaluate the benefits of alternatives.5 But our working logic
sometimes finds merits of an evaluated logic which aren’t available from its own
perspective; this is especially the case when an evaluated logic is so weak that
developing a sufficiently strong syntax and metatheory is extremely difficult.6
So our evaluation of the theoretical virtues can be significantly biased by which
logic we currently accept.
If, then, we adopt the usual simple choice principle—move to an alterna-
tive logic when it does better than our own according to a privileged set of
theoretical virtues—then we can be forced to oscillate between a pair of logical
alternatives as each looks better than the other by their opponent’s lights. Call
this the oscillation problem.
This problem can be solved by resolving only to adopt a logical theory which
is marked not inferior by our current logic if it is also marked not inferior by
its own lights.7 In practice, this constraint favors cases of whole theory com-
parisons where there’s sufficient overlap between the compared logics in which
to do basic metatheory, including a theory of syntax. The solution rules out
many otherwise interesting logical disputes since the metatheory of many logical
alternatives is seriously underdeveloped.
5The situation is more complicated than this, but details would distract here. See both
(Woods forthcoming-a) and below.
6Many recent weak non-classical logics have this problem, as pointed out by Meadows and
Weber (2016) and myself (forthcoming-a).
7Why ‘not inferior’ instead of ‘superior’? This isn’t perversity, it’s to allow that in cases of
ties, we can, though we need not, switch to an alternative. Let no one call me unecumenical.
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It’s thus natural to look for different ways of investigating logical alternatives
that don’t effectively rule out seriously weak logics in advance. And there’s a
natural candidate: perhaps we should focus on piecemeal revisions of our ex-
isting logical theories instead of engaging in comparisons of whole developed
bodies of logical theory. This has the potential to avoid the worries and prob-
lems, like the one we’ve just discussed, which arise from using our logic in the
course of revising our logic. For instance, Hjortland writes:
An abductive argument for a logical theory will inevitably presup-
pose some laws of logic, but that is not incompatible with revision
of logic. All the laws of logic cannot be subject to revision simul-
taneously, nor is that a requirement. The anti-exceptionalist only
needs to hold that no law of logic will be beyond revision. (2016)8
I take it that the suggestion here is that we should evaluate our logical theories
from within, making changes so as to improve their overall coherence and resolve
problems. This in turn suggests using a method like reflective equilibrium in
revising logic and, in fact, reflective equilibrium avoids the most straightforward
versions of the oscillation problem.9 Reflective equilibrium is our most devel-
oped and widely accepted general method for piecemeal revision of theories, so
it’s the natural candidate for logical revision as well. At least prima facie.
More complicated pictures of piecemeal logical revision are also possible, but
they plausibly fall victim to similar, if fancied up, version of the complaints I’ll
raise below.10 Reflective equilibrium will thereby serve as our well-worked out
and probative example of problems for piecemeal approaches to logical revision.
This is because of two things: first, narrowing the relevant virtues to some-
thing like coherence, as in reflective equilibrium, can easily be seen to avoid the
problem of some virtues pointing one way, other virtues another. Second and re-
latedly, there is tremendous flexibility in how to revise our logic so as to increase
coherence. Given these two facts, reflective equilibrium looks more promising as
a methodology for anti-exceptionalist accounts of logic. But again, as always,
promise is one thing and ability another. We now turn to some details.
0.3 Reflective Equilibrium and Logical Revision
Reflective equilibrium was first explicitly sketched by Goodman (1953). Inter-
estingly, his example of a place where we obviously use this method was logic,
though it took over half a century before people explicitly followed him in this.11
The method of reflective equilibrium presumes a distinction between two sorts
8See also Russell (2014), though she is more charitably read as providing a etiological story
about our logical beliefs instead of a justificatory one.
9Hjortland doesn’t explicitly endorse this particular methodology, but it’s a natural expli-
cation of the underlying thought.
10See Mares (2014) for an example of an exquisitely spelled out piecemeal approach.
11I say “interestingly” because one would have expected Goodman to pick up on the problem
I’ll lay out. Perhaps, though, Goodman was simply too influenced by Quine at the time. This
wouldn’t be surprising given that Quine’s account of logic—in terms of the “web of belief”—is
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of “beliefs” about some subject matter.12 The core of reflective equilibrium is
a methodology for bringing these two set of belief into harmony.
One set of beliefs comprises judgments and intuitions about particular cases
of implication.13 These dispositions to judge that particular statements imply
other statements and beliefs that such and so particular immediate inferences
are legitimate are our raw data—they function somewhat similarly to obser-
vations and observation statements. We can divide this raw data up into two
sets—Lp, those dispositional beliefs we take to be probative and Lnp, those we
don’t (writing the pair of these as Lp/np.) We shift material between these two
sets in the course of our investigation.
We’re disposed to recognize that Socrates is wise and good implies that
Socrates is wise and the corresponding inference as entirely unobjectionable.
It’s a clear member of Lp. We’re also disposed to believe
∃ϕ,ψ ¬(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬(ψ → ϕ)
is true; this belief is very plausibly an initial member of Lp. When we come to
treat→ as the material implication, those of us who are sensible move our dispo-
sitional belief in the truth of ∃ϕ,ψ ¬(ϕ→ ψ)∧¬(ψ → ϕ) from Lp to Lnp. Since
we’ve a justification of the correctness of ∀ϕ,ψ (ϕ→ ψ)∨(ψ → ϕ) on the basis of
other principles we accept, we come to see our initial intuition as non-probative.
The other set of beliefs collects up our views about generally valid forms of
implication and inference.14 This set, LG, contains such banalities as the belief
that conjunctions imply their conjuncts and that inferring a conjunct from a
conjunction is universally legitimate, as well as more technical beliefs like the
quantifier-negation commutation rules and contentious beliefs like the (logical)
validity of the ω-rule.
This might suggest that a logic is simply a set of (logically true) statements,
a picture strongly associated with Quine’s account of logic. This would be
problematic—as has been repeatedly pointed out over the years, this aspect of
Quine’s picture is simply inadequate in theorizing different logics. Quite dif-
ferent logics generate the same set of logical truths and some quite common
logics, like K3, have no logical truths at all. Reflective equilibrium is not at
all committed to this mistake; rather, our sets of general beliefs will include
strikingly similar to Goodman’s. Here I treat both as instances of the reflective equilibrium
picture, flagging where the differences matter.
12I’ll speak loosely here, lumping all kinds of representational states together as beliefs.
Pedantic precision would distract here.
13Of course, we also want to distinguish between implication and inference more generally,
but our intuitions aren’t as clean as those who make this distinction would like. I’ll not fuss
much about the distinction between these since it’s generally orthogonal to the points I want
to make.
14Of course, distinguishing between LG and Lp/np in actual practice isn’t trivial, not by a
long shot. As my aim here is primarily critical, I won’t worry about this.
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all kinds of claims about which argument forms are valid and which inferential
transitions are legitimate.
The content of the beliefs in LG predicts the validity of certain particular
cases of implication—we’ll write this prediction relationship LG ⇒ I. In the
best case, the predictions of LG won’t clash with Lp; when they do—when
there’s q ∈ Lp such that q claims I as incorrect—we have tension (writing this
as ⊥(LG, q,I).) There can be relative degrees of coherence between LG and
Lp, depending on the number and “depth” of instances of ⊥.15 Tension, of
various degrees, is common even in logic. Since many such tensions don’t wear
their solution on their face and since investigation over the years shows costs
and benefits of any solution, this fact itself motivates some versions of anti-
exceptionalism.
For example, while most theorists think that modus ponens is generally valid,
some of these theorists also have the intuition that McGee-style instances (1985)
aren’t. Personally, I think the introduction and elimination laws for the truth-
predicate are logically valid, as are both modus ponens and conditional proof,
even though English is semantically closed.16 However, I don’t want to recognize
the triviality that follows from these four beliefs by means of Curry’s paradox
(or, god forbid, reject a structural rule). And so on.
To improve the coherence of our collection of beliefs and, thereby, to improve
our justification for maintaining them, we tweak our system of beliefs in a sys-
tematic fashion. First we apply the rules endorsed by LG in order to generate
predictions which cause conflict. In order to resolve the conflict, we revise LG to
fit with Lp and, correspondingly, move members of Lp to Lnp (and conversely)
to reduce tension with LG. Then we reapply the rules again to generate more
conflict (or, in the best case, to delightfully see that all apparent conflict has
been resolved.)
The aim is to improve the coherence between the predictions of the general
beliefs and the “observational” data of our dispositional beliefs about particular
cases. If we take coherence of these two to be a or, even more strongly, the
significant good-making epistemic feature of a set of beliefs, then through this
process the resulting package of beliefs about logic becomes progressively more
epistemically justified.17
When the whole body of such beliefs reaches a point where disagreement
15We need something like depth to avoid simply measuring coherence by counting instances
of tension; intuitively, some tension is more dramatic than others. Again, details would
distract from the main point so I’ll leave this at an intuitive level. See §0.5.2 for a strategy
on which “depth” is taken more seriously.
16Or, alternatively, my arithmetical beliefs legitimate arithmetical resources extending
Robinson arithmetic. In my case, both.
17See McPherson (2015) for trenchant arguments that reflective equilibrium falters here.
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has been maximally minimized—for example, when all dispositions to judge
predicted implications as invalid have ceased, been explained away, or cease to
be predicted—then the system is in reflective equilibrium.18 When this is just
coherence between LG and Lp/np, then we say that the theory is in narrow re-
flective equilibrium.
In the case of logic, we need other facts besides those just concerning impli-
cation in order to explain away our intuitions. We need psychology to explain
away the widespread tendency for people to fail to recognize cases of modus
tollens. Likewise, we should probably demand that our logical theories cohere
with background constraints such as the ability to recapture obviously true con-
tentual mathematics like elementary fragments of arithmetic.19
When our logical theory and intuitions achieves both internal coherence and
coherence with a large body of presupposed background theory from other ar-
eas, we say it is in wide reflective equilibrium.It seems we should aim for at least
somewhat wide reflective equilibrium, given the above examples. I’ll assume so
moving forward.20
This brief gloss on reflective equilibrium will do for our purposes. We won’t
make much hay of the distinction between wide or narrow reflective equilibrium
or focus overly much on the endpoint of the process. Our focus will be on the
process itself and on whether successive revisions confers a form of epistemic
justification on the theory so arrived at.
0.3.1 Evaluating Coherence and Prediction
Observe that we didn’t define ‘coherence’, ‘prediction’, or ‘confirmation’. This
was for good reason: the best accounts of these notions—in fact, all reasonable
accounts of these, good or not—make essential use of an implication relation.
This means that we need to settle which account of implication will govern how
we evaluate the coherence of our logical theory, what our general beliefs pre-
dict, and how our dispositional beliefs confirm or not our general beliefs. This
is a problem local to the application of reflective equilibrium to logic and per-
haps elementary fragments of mathematics. Applying this methodology to most
non-logical matters, this issue doesn’t arise as the relevant theoretical resources
involved in explicating coherence, prediction, and confirmation are held fixed.21
18Note that the property of being in reflective equilibrium is really defined internally to LG.
In principle, this means that it’s possible that according to one way of cashing out what LG
predicts, our beliefs are in reflective equilibrium, but according to another way, it’s not. This
is especially pertinent when dealing with disputes about logic; see below.
19We need the ability to theorize about notions of proof and derivability as well (see §0.4.1),
but it’s not clear whether or not to treat this as part of LG. I’ll assume so going forward, for
simplicity, flagging up where it matters.
20For more examples which could be massaged into showing that narrow equilibrium isn’t
sufficient, see Williamson (manuscript).
21Another potential exception is theoretical normativity itself, though it’s worth noting that
the problem appears most drastic in the case of logic. See Woods (2018) for discussion.
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When comparing a pair of logics, we have a few options about which logic
to use in assessing their various merits—in particular, in drawing out the ex-
tensions of ⇒ and ⊥.22 We could use our current logic—here something like
what’s articulated by LG—in assessing the coherence and predictions of LG and
an alternative LG′ . Alternatively, we could use LG to assess the coherence and
predictions of LG and LG′ to assess the coherence and predictions of LG′ . Both
are natural ways of proceeding, at least at first glance.
But, on second glance, it’s significantly more reasonable to use LG to assess
the predictions and coherence of LG and Lp/np and LG′ to assess the predictions
and coherence of LG′ and Lp′/np′ . What about using LG, our starting set of
logical beliefs, to assess the coherence of LG and Lp/np as well as the coherence
of LG′ and Lp′/np′? That is, what about using our current logical beliefs in order
to assess what both our current logic predicts and what the effects of resolving a
bit of incoherence would be? This, turns out, is unreasonable. Many problems
due to members of LG will persist, by the lights of LG, even after we move from
LG to LG′ .
Suppose LG ⇒ ∆ |= ϕ, for ∆ “in” LG and where Lp holds that ϕ isn’t
correct—i.e. where we have ⊥(LG, p,¬ϕ). One natural way to revise our beliefs
is to ensure that ∆ |= ϕ isn’t predicted by LG′ by making corresponding changes
to the beliefs supporting this entailment in LG. If, however, we evaluate the
predictions of LG′ by LG, presuming even a minimal amount of closure, we’ve
got a problem. ∆ is still in LG, so LG ⇒ ϕ, and so we have ⊥(LG′ , p,¬ϕ) and
our tension remains unresolved.
Since reflective equilibrium targets a bit of tension then resolves it, then the
above situation will tempt us to move our intuition about ϕ from Lp to Lnp.
After all, this really does resolve the tension and ∆ might be more or less invi-
olate. But continually resolving Lp/np—instead of sometimes revising what LG
predicts—seems a bad tendency in applying the method of reflective equilib-
rium, undermining much of its intuitive appeal. LG and Lp/np are supposed to
be roughly equal players in the game of reflective equilibrium; this fact seems es-
sential to reflective equilibrium conveying epistemic justification on its outcome.
So we should be less ecumenical about which logic to use in coming up with
our revisions here; for simple applications of reflective equilibrium, we should
use LG to assess its own predictions and tension with Lp/np for all stages of
LG and Lp/np. That is, as we revise our logical beliefs, we should continually
update our account of what they predict in line with these revisions; moreover,
when considering a potential revision, we should assess what would result by the
lights of the proposed revision, not by the lights of our current logical beliefs.
We can (and will) finesse the problem for now by treating the extension of ⇒
22See Woods (forthcoming-a) for further discussion.
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and ⊥ as themselves parts of LG. This means that ⊥ and ⇒ are generated
‘pointwise’ at every stage of revision.23 We’ll relax this restriction below in the
positive proposal section.
0.3.2 Reflective Equilibrium v. Whole Theory Comparison
Again, the differences between the picture I’ve just spelled out and the whole
theory comparison picture may seem mostly ones of emphasis and application.
And, again, reflective equilibrium can be seen as whole theory comparisons
with a single theoretical virtue—coherence between LG and Lp/np (and our
broader scientific beliefs)—and a narrow scope of available alternatives. There
will hardly be the body of developed logical theory that’s characteristic of the
logical alternatives—intuitionistic, relevantistic, etc.—typically being compared
in whole logic comparisons.
When comparing the costs of two developed bodies of logical theory, like
intuitionistic and classical logic, we have decades of refinement at our disposal
and a determinate sense of what can and cannot be done in each. But as the
majority of proposed revisions we encounter in carrying out reflective equilib-
rium will be novel (and many extremely surprising), we have significantly less
knowledge of the consequences of revising while so revising. A fortiori, we have
significantly less knowledge to work with in building a case for revising any
particular way. So even though we could treat reflective equilibrium like a case
of whole-theory comparison, this would obfuscate potentially epistemically sig-
nificant differences that our pre-existing knowledge makes to the reasons we
actually have when evaluating logics.
It’s the restriction to one governing theoretical virtue—coherence—that is
useful in dealing with our initial motivating problem. Since we are only evalu-
ating coherence, it’s more difficult to find cases where successive revisions result
in cycles. That would require that small coherence-improving revisions could
land you back into the same place over time; this is possible, but it’s difficult to
come up with an especially compelling determinate case for it. The restriction
to a single theoretical virtue makes it easier to avoid cases where cross-cutting
theoretical virtues will push us back and forth in the course of successive revi-
sions.
We’ll thus assume for present purposes that simple reflective equilibrium
improves over typical cases of whole-theory comparisons with respect to wor-
ries about revision cycles. So presumed, reflective equilibrium yields a fairly
straightforward and compelling account of how our logical beliefs are justified.
It doesn’t require any form of a priori knowledge or magical capacity of rational
insight to make sense of how our beliefs are justified. It also fits nicely with
23Of course, the problems raised below can be iterated given this assumption, but let that
pass. The situation is bad enough as it is.
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historical facts about the piecewise development of contemporary logical ortho-
doxy over time, such as our gradual relinquishing of existential import.24
And it puts the justification of logical beliefs on a par with widely en-
dorsed views about the proper methodology in developing a naturalistic account
of other non-empirical matters—inductive methods (Goodman 1953), justice
(Rawls 1971), normativity (Scanlon 2014), and so on. However, the case of logic
is different from these since logic occupies two roles in reflective equilibrium—
—as both the object of our theorizing and as the arbiter of our theorizing.
When the target of reflective equilibrium occupies these two roles an interesting
problem emerges.
0.4 the degrees of freedom problem — intuitive ver-
sion
This problem was first raised during Crispin Wright’s criticism of Quine’s views
on logic (1986). It was subsequently refined by Stewart Shapiro in his criticism
of Resnik’s (1997):
Suppose that a logician has an intuition that a certain argument A is
invalid, and wants to see if this intuition coheres with her evolving
logical theory T. Sadly, she finds out that the invalidity conflicts
with T. Consider the sentence:
(*) The theory T is not in accord with the invalidity of the argu-
ment A
presumably accepted by the theorist. We are told that any sentence
is up for revision. Can our logician maintain both T and the inva-
lidity of A by rejecting (*)? That is, can our logician just reject the
inference from T to the validity of A? Regress threatens. (2000)
Regress maybe, but the real issue here seems different to me. It’s that we simply
have too many options—we have too many degrees of freedom—in how to in-
crease the coherence of our logical theories in the face of recalcitrance. I’ll start
by raising the problem in an intuitive fashion—i.e. without further analyzing
prediction or conflict—then briefly discuss more complicated reconstructions.
Suppose we have a dispositional belief p that a certain implication I is in-
valid, yet our general beliefs predict its validity. We have two prima facie
legitimate ways of revising our logical beliefs: (1) revise the bit of LG that’s
predicting I and (2) move p from Lp to Lnp. And, in both cases, making other
reasonable adjustments like dropping conjunctions in these sets which contain
the revised bit, etc.
24See Church (1964) for a history of existential import and Hanson (1989) for a compelling
case for its status as a recalcitrance in our logical theorizing.
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However, reflective equilibrium also permits the following moves: (3) remove
LG ⇒ I from LG, leaving much of the rest alone, and (4) remove ⊥(p,LG, I)
from LG, leaving much of the rest alone. After all, these two cited facts are, by
assumption (though see below), just further members of LG. On the Quinoid
web-of-belief version of the anti-exceptionalist picture that Shapiro and Wright
target, it’s explicit that LG ⇒ I and ⊥(p,LG, I) are just further bits of theory.
If they’re just more beliefs in LG, then denying their revisability fact treats the
logic of evaluation as special. This is strongly at odds with anti-exceptionalism.
So the anti-exceptionalist needs to allow that facts about ⊥ and ⇒ can also be
revised.
Both (3) and (4) remove the tension with Lp/np. The tension is represented
by ⊥(p,LG, I) and predicted by LG ⇒ I so removing either alleviates the in-
coherence. In doing so, we cease to believe that LG predicted tension or cease
to believe that the predictions of LG were tension-involving. Given that these
revisions leave our intuitions untouched and preserve the central portions of LG,
they are officially minimally damaging and thereby attractive revisions.
Unofficially and actually, they’re grotesque. We should not be able to simply
revise away tension by removing our belief in it—after all, it’s still there—or
denying that our general logical beliefs predict it. Revising logic in this way
is rather like hiring a plumber to fix a leaky pipe, then watching them look at
the growing puddle of water on the floor and insist the pipe is fine. Even if we
believe them, we’re gonna have soggy carpet.
It seems of rather little use to have a “coherent” system of beliefs when
whenever we were faced with conflict we could always modify what we believe
LG predicts so as resolve the “incoherence”. And a system of belief in reflective
equilibrium resulting from a sequence of such moves will be more or less useless,
at least by our current lights. And if we can’t say that from within the terminal
state of our process of reflective equilibrium, so much the worse for reflective
equilibrium.
Sometimes modifying ⇒ or ⊥ will be the correct move, but it can’t always
be both available and attractive. It seems ridiculous that when we have our
theory’s predictions disconfirmed, we can always recover by simply denying that
there is any disconfirmation. The process of reflective equilibrium is supposed
to be a process by which we match theory to evidence and evidence to theory.
It’s pointless to engage in such a project if we can get ourselves into reflective
equilibrium by simply revising away our beliefs about coherence or prediction.
0.4.1 Complicating the degrees of freedom problem?
The version of degrees of freedom problem just given presumed that coherence
and prediction were to be represented by the beliefs in LG which involve ⊥ and
⇒. Presumably these are somewhat informed by the other members of LG as
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well, but essentially what’s predicated by LG is what LG more or less directly
says is predicated by LG.
We might try to avoid this problem by explicitly defining coherence and
prediction. For instance, we might try defining ⇒ as follows: LG ⇒ ϕ just in
case ϕ can be derived by repeated application of the “rules” endorsed by LG.
25
Likewise, we could treat coherence in terms of LG predicting or containing some
claim ϕ whose contradictory was in Lp.
Unfortunately, this doesn’t move us far enough from the original version of
the problem. Since reflective equilibrium is supposed to be a method we can
actually employ, conveying justifications we can cite in favor of our revisions,
medical limitations restrict our ability to use coherence and prediction in revis-
ing our logical theories. This is one of those important ‘basing’-type restrictions
we mentioned above. We need to be able to recognize and display that our move
is justified.
We thus need to use what we (defeasibly) justifiably believe about prediction
and coherence instead of what actually holds about prediction and coherence
in revising. In practice, this means that we need to have a minimal theory
of derivability in order to have a suitably expansive collection of beliefs about
prediction and coherence. This in turn means that we need to have a suitably
strong theory of syntax and inductive definitions in order to carry out the basic
metatheoretic results which undergird our beliefs about what LG predicts. And
these are certainly part of LG and thereby revisable on the anti-exceptionalist
picture.26
If our beliefs about this metatheory are themselves revisable—if they aren’t
privileged over other members of LG—then we have not improved over our in-
tuitive version of the problem. We can still revise away any seeming tension or
bad prediction by revising—presumably in somewhat ad hoc ways—our theories
of syntax and inductive definitions. Of course, ad hoc revisions are bad in some
way, but our methodology does not by itself make any use of theoretical virtues
beyond coherence in permissible revisions; nor does wide reflective equilibrium
itself require our beliefs to be non-gerrymandered.27
It’s tempting to lean back on some kind of idealization to avoid this problem
25Again, as above, we’re leaving this informal. Strictly speaking we’d need to somehow
isolate the rules from other members of LG.
26Alternatively, we could treat these as part of the widened body of beliefs that LG needs
to cohere with. Even then, we can modify their impact by modifying instances of ⇒ involving
these materials. Nothing substantial turns on this, so I’ll presume they’re part of LG going
forward.
27Insofar as we’re willing to block ad hoc revisions, we could have already used the typical
ad-hoc-ness of (3) and (4) to focus on the two reasonable options (1) and (2) for proceeding
in the face of tension. And do so without giving the more detailed story about prediction and
coherence. See below.
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and, in other contexts, this is unproblematic. So long as enough of our theo-
retical tools are “fixed” for the purposes of application of reflective equilibrium,
then we can use the idealized versions of ⇒ and ⊥ to avoid the degrees of free-
dom problem. But when logic is the target of our investigation, then exactly
what can be derived by repeated applications of materials in LG is something
itself captured by what’s in LG. In other words, “ideal” isn’t LG neutral. So
idealization isn’t available to us here (see Woods (forthcoming-a) for detailed
discussion of these cases for whole-theory comparisons.)
0.5 Avoiding the Degrees of Freedom Problem
Moving to the more detailed account of prediction and coherence doesn’t allevi-
ate our problem—the problem is real. Wright (1986) argues on this basis that
at least some of logic needs to be treated as a priori and fixed for the purpose
of carrying out reflective equilibrium. As pointed out by Ahmed (2000), among
others, this seems too strong. Even for the Quinoid view that every belief,
including those about prediction and coherence, is revisable, it’s enough that
there be some situation in which it’s reasonable to revise it. As pointed out by
Elstein (2007, fn. 4), we would also really like the ability to explain when it is
and when it is not appropriate to revise in addition to “in principle” revisabil-
ity for all our logical beliefs. This combination would be a potent solution to
Wright’s problem.
We might worry, though, about whether we can manage something so strong
as explanation. We can put this issue to the side—though I’m sympathetic—as
what seems absolutely unavoidable is some additional, epistemically significant,
guidance for our revising. If we can’t find this, then Wright’s problem is simply
unavoidable. But providing guidance in our revisions seems to again involve
mustering additional resources which themselves are revisable. Care needs to
be taken to ensure we’re not just moving the bump in the rug. What kind of
guidance is necessary and what would it involve?
0.5.1 Guidance
The requisite guidance can’t simply be something as epistemically neutral as
a disposition to revise this way as opposed to that, not unless we’re willing to
wholeheartedly endorse a purely coherentist notion of epistemic justification.
Doing so would be pyrrhic since our problem arises exactly from the existence
of ways of restoring “coherence” which deny blatant implications of our general
logical beliefs in conflict with our logical intuitions.
Coherentist pictures look far more stable when the background logic used to
define a notion of coherence taken as fixed. When even what counts as coher-
ence is up for grabs, they look a bit besides the point. Leaning on what we’re
disposed to do in the face of significant recalcitrance doesn’t help much; why
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should our mere temptations be epistemically significant?28
We need guidance which tracks the intuitive reasonableness of certain ways
of revising our logical beliefs. We need a way of guiding our revisions which
itself helps to convey justification on our revising. But what would such a
notion look like? It’s difficult to see without compromising on our assumed
anti-exceptionalist scruples. There are two natural suggestions which I’ll now
briefly explore with the implicit (well, now explicit) suggestion that all other
alternatives collapse into one or the other.
First, the anti-exceptionalist could expand on the theoretical virtues used in
deciding how to revise a particular instance of recalcitrance.29 Revising a bit
of LG or Lp/np is one thing, but revising ⇒ or ⊥ seems significantly ad hoc. If
minimal ad hoc ness is a theoretical virtue, these revisions will be disfavored.30
Care needs to be taken with this method to preserve both the anti-exceptionalist
standpoint and the advantage reflective equilibirum has over whole-theory com-
parisons.
Second, the anti-exceptionalist could invoke the obviousness of various im-
plications (along the lines of Harman 1986 and Field 2009) in order to guide
our revisions. Or, similarly, they could define a notion of the “depth” of certain
revisions and then use this to decide in a principled way which of the various
members of LG and Lp/np to revise. As with our first patch, care needs to be
taken with this method to preserve both the anti-exceptionalist standpoint and
the epistemic significance of the favored materials guiding revisions.
Each approach invokes additional materials in order to guide our revisions
in a way which avoids the degree of freedom problem. The question then
arises whether they retain the distinct advantages of the piecemeal approach
without either collapsing into an implausible coherentism or abandoning anti-
exceptionalism. I claim, and will now argue, that the plausible ways of devel-
oping this kind of guidance do exactly this. It’s thus dubious that reflective
equilibrium is significantly better than whole theory comparison as an anti-
exceptionalist methodology. We’ll take the patches in reverse order.
28It’s important to be clear about what, exactly, this point amounts to. I’m not denying
that the contents of, say, LG could explicate a reasonable notion of coherence at a particular
point in time. Many reasonable conventionalist and fellow traveler lines will accept something
like this. Rather, I’m denying that moving from LG to L
′
G, guided merely by what we’re
disposed to do, is seen as an epistemically responsible way of proceeding. I hope to revisit
these interesting issues elsewhere.
29Though finding the right set of theoretical virtues for logic is itself a rather tricky matter.
See Russell (forthcoming) for useful examples involving theoretical strength.
30I’ll focus on ad hockery below but the points generalize.
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0.5.2 Theoretical Virtues to the Rescue?
Yet again, reflective equilibrium can be construed as a particular form of whole
theory comparison making use of only one theoretical virtue—coherence be-
tween LG and Lp/np—and a limited field of logical alternatives—those easily
reachable by piecemeal revisions of our logical beliefs. Given this, adding guid-
ance by adding additional theoretical virtues is attractive. But which theoretical
virtues? This is important since theoretical virtues which depend on an impli-
cation relation don’t provide any advantageous guidance since we could then
modify whether or not our current stage of revision has that virtue by modi-
fying the implication relation encoded in LG. Because of this, the oscillation
problem raised above reemerges since these virtues might themselves trade off
against one another in ways which are essentially dependent on our currently
accepted implication relation.
Which theoretical virtues have epistemic significance, yet aren’t obviously
beholden to an implication relationship? The natural ones to lean on are the
aesthetic theoretical virtues like elegance and minimizing ad hoc-ery.31 And,
sure enough, revising ⇒ or ⊥ nearly always seems ad hoc. However, even ad
hoc-ness potentially needs theorizing in terms of implication. Here’s Thagard’s
gloss:
We cannot condemn a theory for introducing a hypothesis to explain
a particular fact, since all theorists employs such hypotheses. The
hypotheses can be reprehended only if ongoing investigation fails
either to uncover new facts that they help to explain or to find more
direct evidence for them. (Thagard 78: 87)
Since we can’t always find this in advance, presumably our assessment of whether
a move is ad hoc reflects our confidence that the hypothesis won’t directly ex-
plain anything else or be explained by something more fundamental. That is,
we’re going to need further beliefs about what will or will not be explained by a
hypothesis. These beliefs in turn explain whether we see a particular hypothesis
as ad hoc.
But explanation and, of course, evidential relations themselves are condi-
tioned by a background implication relationship. This yields our familiar pair
of problems. First, we can modify our evaluation of ad hockery by means of
modifying our beliefs about⇒ and ⊥, thereby changing what can explain what.
This seems to undermine the role of ad hockery as a piece of epistemically sig-
nificant guidance.
Second, and because of this, we can end up in revision cycles when the
background logic changes. Criteria like the coherence of our two sets of be-
liefs and avoidance of ad hockery can trade off one for the other. Add enough
31See Lipton (2004: 66) for a gloss on these virtues as aesthetic.
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subsidiary members to LG and our previously seeming ad hoc change will look
well-evidenced, but massively incoherent; revise⇒ or ⊥ enough to fix this prob-
lem, our theory will look coherent but ad hoc. It’s easy to see how to construct
a cycle out of these materials.
Similar problems emerge for other choices of theoretical virtues. Unless a
virtue is independent of our background logic, the resulting picture become open
to the sort of cycles that undermine its effectiveness as a methodology. And if
they are independent, then it seems difficult to treat them as epistemically pro-
bative. After all, we’ve already got a set of basic intuitions about validity and
invalidity (Lp/np) playing a role in our decision process. Adding to these some-
thing like a psychological or perceptually-based theoretical virtue seems unlikely
to make the situation better in any significant way.
Suppose we added something like beauty or elegance to our evaluation
method. It’s hard to see the resulting method would avoid the degrees of free-
dom problem. After all, though it seems a bit ad hoc to deny instances of ⊥
or ⇒, it does have a certain iconoclastic charm to it. And it’s entirely unclear
that our intuitions about the inelegance or ugliness of a revision would persist
after performing the revision.
Even if there is some way to make good on some additional theoretical
virtues, it still seems as if we can iterate the degrees of freedom problem here.
The guidance we have about how to revise is itself open to revision; we can
simply, in the face of recalcitrance, revise our judgment about the simplicity,
strength, or elegance of a particular proposed revision.
Why is this? Just like with our beliefs about ⇒ and ⊥, we’re going to have
to lean back on some kind of implicit theory of beauty or elegance to avoid
cases where our judgment is simply perverse. But, once we’ve done this, we can
simply revise this implicit theory exactly as we could revise our implicit theory
of⇒ and ⊥.32 So without additional materials, the degrees of freedom problem
in fact grows worse here; more virtues, more degrees of freedom. Constraint is
necessary.
If this approach is to be defended, the burden seems clearly on its proponent
to give a set of theoretical virtues which manages to actually avoid the degrees
of freedom problem, but which doesn’t end up reducing reflective equilibrium to
cyclic-prone whole theory comparisons. If this is the result of adding theoretical
virtues, a case can be made that the proponent of reflective equilibrium needs
to adopt constraints in order to block the possibility of cycles and constrain the
theoretical options open to the logical revisionary. They then owe us a story
about such constraints which (a) stays true to our anti-exceptionalist starting
32You might think that this implicit theory is independent of our logical beliefs—maybe so.
But what it implies is not independent of our logical beliefs.
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point and (b) isn’t open to the selfsame problems. We now turn to our other
general option for patching up reflective equilibrium.
0.5.3 Immediately Obvious Implication to the Rescue?
The solution initially suggested by Wright (and toyed with by Shapiro), in-
volves treating a portion of the logic used in logical revision as a priori and
unrevisable (at least at the present moment). This particular solution aban-
dons anti-exceptionalism, but there is a related alternative that seems prima
facie more promising. We could use of the notion of an obvious or immedi-
ately compelling implication. This isn’t anti-anti-exceptionalist—after all, some
non-logical transitions are themselves obvious or immediately compelling. Just
consider “today is Tuesday, so tomorrow is Wednesday.”
The idea would be, then, that many instances of ⇒ and ⊥ are usually im-
mediately compelling in a way that many other members of LG are not. If we
require our successive revisions minimize revisions of obvious or immediately
compelling logical beliefs, then we have a principled reason to avoid revising
⇒ or ⊥, solving the degrees of freedom problem without abandoning our anti-
exceptionalist starting point.
The trouble is that it’s unclear why transitions that seem obvious should
be somehow epistemically privileged over those which do not. After all, many
of our implicit balks at valid implications are rather deep. Likewise, much of
the appeal of fallacious reasoning even resists expertise about the underlying
issues, as the Wason selection test (Wason 1968) and Monty Hall problem seem
to show. Why then take a property of some transitions which regularly misfires
to be of epistemic significance? If we accepted a flatly coherentist picture of
epistemic justification, then perhaps such psychological guidance is rationally
permissible, but it’s exactly this sort of contingency in acquiring a coherent set
of beliefs that puts people off coherentism in the first place.
Moreover, few of the tensions motivating our actual logical theorizing are
cases of obvious or immediate implications conflicting with other parts of our
logical beliefs—these tend to be screened out relatively early. The more typi-
cal situations are (a) distinct non-obvious parts of our logical beliefs conflicting
with each other and (b) conflict between beliefs which are more or less equally
obvious. But in such cases we really don’t have sufficient guidance to resolve
the problem. So there’s a large conjecture for this approach—that ⊥ and ⇒
really are typically more obvious than other revisions—which we need to make
good on. I’m rather pessimistic.
Putting such problems to the side, this kind of approach privileges Lp/np
over LG in ways that unbalance the point and anti-exceptionalist character of
reflective equilibrium. After all, if we refrain from revising away our disposi-
tion to treat various implications as obvious or immediate, then we treat our
Australasian Journal of Logic (16:7) 2019, Article no. 7
337
dispositional logical intuitions as privileged over our background logical theory.
Given the intuitive parity between average members of Lp/np and those dealing
with immediacy, this means that we’ll be guided to revise LG at the expense of
Lp/np, treating our intuitions about logical theory as having more weight than
settled bodies of logical theorizing. This seems problematic; why should our
dispositional beliefs about logic—especially in light of the well-known problems
for them—be treated as epistemically privileged?
However, if we treat our dispositions to recognize various members of LG as
obvious or immediate as as revisable as any other belief about logic, then we lose
our solution to the degrees of freedom problem. We can improve coherence by
moving our dispositional belief that an obvious implication is obvious from Lp
to Lnp as well as revising the implication itself. One might claim that making
multiple revisions should be resisted, but as pointed out above, revisions of our
logical beliefs are nearly always going to require making adjustments elsewhere
in LG and Lp/np. So this way out looks problematic, resulting in either an
epistemically unhealthy dependence on contingent psychological dispositions or
resulting in an epicycle of the degrees of freedom problem.
0.5.4 Generalization and Upshot
As we’ve just seen, these patches are flawed. They each fail in at least one of
four ways, depending on the particulars of the view. First there are patches
which add guiding materials which aren’t revisable:
• If the requisite guiding materials are of the right type to be revised—say,
beliefs about elegance or simplicity—then these patches simply exempt
them from revision. But this amounts to a form of exceptionalism, albeit
not quite exceptionalism about logic. It seems out of the spirit of the
anti-exceptionalist program to allow guiding materials to be immune to
revision but allow logic to be revised. It also seems to privilege the less
epistemically fundamental over the more epistemically fundamental, losing
a bit of the justificatory credentials of the method as well.
• Alternatively, we might add guiding materials which are by their nature,
say, resistant to revision. These might include our psychological inclina-
tion to revise this way rather than that. But this is problematic since it’s
unclear why our psychological dispositions are probative, especially given
that we’ve already accounted for them once already by their inclusion in
Lp.
Second there are patches where we don’t exempt the guidance from revision:
• But if we can revise our judgments about, say, the elegance or simplicity
of a particular revision, the degrees of freedom problem remains. We can
just simultaneously revise ⇒ and our judgments about the inelegance of
so revising in any case of recalcitrance. In principle, adding revisable
Australasian Journal of Logic (16:7) 2019, Article no. 7
338
materials makes the degrees of freedom problem worse, not better. More
materials, more degrees of freedom.
And for many, if not most, of these approaches:
• Adding in a second theoretical virtue, such as elegance, makes oscillation
more likely as these virtues can trade off against one another; since our
evaluation itself might change as we revise, we’ll risk being in a position
where the virtues of our previous logic and the vices of our current one
become apparent once we’ve revised. Again, adding in more theoretical
virtues tends to undermine the putative advantage of piecemeal methods
like reflective equilibrium in dealing with problems like oscillation.
So it looks like adding enough guidance to avoid the degrees of freedom
problem can’t be done without either obviating the putative advantages of the
piecemeal method or relinquishing its justificatory credentials. At best, the bur-
den is on the defender of the piecemeal approach to find an anti-exceptionalist
way of guiding our revisions which is both epistemically respectable and not
open to iterations of the degrees of freedom problem.
There doesn’t seem to be a reasonable way to salvage reflective equilibrium
as a distinctive methodology for logical revision. In short, the advantages the
piecemeal approach seemed to have over whole-theory comparisons comes at
simply too high a cost. But the piecemeal approach does track methods we
actually use in carrying our revisions to our logical beliefs sometimes, so it’s
worth briefly closing with what the most reasonable version of the piecemeal
approach looks like.
0.6 Learning from Failure
I conjecture that the best option for the anti-exceptionalist inclined towards
piecemeal revision involves adding two elements. First, they should make use
of additional theoretical virtues, such as the ad hoc ness of various resolutions
of tension, to increase the guidance of their choice of coherence-increasing ad-
justments. Unfortunately, as pointed about above, this only helps if these the-
oretical virtues are themselves such that revisions of them are trayfe. And just
stipulating this again seems to do disservice to the anti-exceptionalist position.
So we need to find a way of blocking such revisions which is in the spirit of
anti-exceptionalism.
How do we block these revisions? One way of doing so, my favored, would
involve adopting a constraint I’ve defended elsewhere. This constraint, logical
partisans, says that we only ought to revise our logical beliefs when both my
current viewpoint and the revised viewpoint agree that the revision wasn’t any
worse than not revising. It’s original motivation was to minimize the danger of
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revision cycles, but it has a payoff in this context.33
Suppose that there’s an opportunity to revise, albeit ad hoc ly, ⇒ in order
to resolve some tension. Let T1 be the current state of our logical beliefs (i.e.
LG and Lp/np) and T2 the state that results from revising ⇒ and making the
other necessary adjustments. T2, though it resolves the tension with T1, never-
theless incurs a cost in the measure of its ad-hoc-ness. So T2 will typically be
less preferable than other resolution. This initially promising bit of guidance
requires nothing from logical partisans.
logical partisans, though, blocks the lurking alternative of revising both
⇒ and our judgments about how ad hoc revising⇒ is. This revision can be done
either by adding to LG materials that predict the change, thereby reducing the
ad hoc character of the change or by simply revising our judgment about how ad
hoc T2 is. However, even though T2 will now judge T2 preferable to T1; by the
lights of T1, T2 is still massively ad hoc, which is a strongly bad-making feature
of a logical view. So, so long as ad hockery is weighted sufficiently heavily, T2 is
worse by both the lights of T1. logical partisans thus blocks this potential
move.34 We have the guidance we need to avoid the degrees of freedom problem
in this case.
Similar stories can be told about revising ⊥ and the theoretical virtues them-
selves. The story just told captures the necessary amount of guidance demanded
by the degrees of freedom problem without abandoning the piecemeal project
entirely. Our current story generalizes whole-theory comparisons to a wider
class of alternatives where we don’t have a settled body of information about
the virtues and vices of the logics being compared. It also gives a diachronic,
anti-exceptionalist, justificatory story about how we might eventually end up at
a settled position about logic.35
Summing up, the combination of logical partisans and theoretical virtues
other than coherence will plausibly block the most troubling cases of the de-
33logical partisans doesn’t entirely avoid this danger for reflective equilibrium since it’s
possible that a sequence of adjustments, each locally acceptable, would result in a cycle.
logical partisans can be generalized for sequences of revisions, of course, but perhaps it
would be better to just live with a little epistemic risk. I hope to discuss this in further work.
34The weighting itself helps to resolve the problem mentioned above about which logic we
use in predicting coherence; logical partisans requires using both T1 and T2 in evaluating
moving to T2 from T1. If the theoretical virtues are heavily weighted enough, then grounds
for revising our judgments about them (as well as about prediction and coherence) will be
sufficiently demanding that the recovery of some tension when we evaluate T2 by the lights
of T1 won’t automatically be problematic. One more detailed option is to think of us as
generating a field of options Tn. . . Tk using T1, then evaluating whether each pair (T1, Tj)
violates logical partisans. A story would still need to be told about how much “closure” we
build into ⇒ when proceeding with reflective equilibrium, but that’s not an issue I can enter
into in this essay.
35Providing a justificatory adjunct to stories like Russell’s (2014) about how to come to
have a particular set of logical beliefs.
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grees of freedom problem. It does so without eliminating the main virtue of
the piecemeal method—the freedom to revise our logical beliefs in different,
equally coherence-increasing ways. It favors revision of the non-metatheoretic
bits of LG or Lp/np—i.e. not the bits concerning coherence, prediction, and the-
oretical virtues—since such revisions will typically not result in dramatic shift
of the theoretical goodness of our logical theories. It remains staunchly anti-
exceptionalist, as no principle, intuition, belief about validity, or belief about
the theoretical virtues of a logical system is in principle blocked; it contains,
however, sufficient exceptionalism about our current standpoint to largely avoid
both the degrees of freedom problem and the oscillation problem. My closing
conjecture is that this combination of logical partisans and multiple theo-
retical virtues is the best way to address Wright’s problem and thereby develop
the piecemeal method for logical revision.
References
Ahmed, Arif. 2000. Hale on Some Arguments for the Necessity of Necessity.
Mind, 109(433), 81–91.
Bueno, Ota´vio, & Colyvan, Mark. 2004. Logical Non-Apriorism and the Law
of Non-Contradiction. The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical
Essays, 156–175.
Church, Alonzo. 1964. The History of the Question of Existential Import of
Categorical Propositions. In: Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua (ed), Logic, Method-
ology, and Philosophy of Science (Proceedings of the 1964 International
Congress). North-Holland.
Elstein, Daniel Y. 2007. A New Revisability Paradox. Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly, 88(3), 308–318.
Field, Hartry. 2009. What is the Normative Role of Logic? Aristotelian Soci-
ety Supplementary Volume, 83(1), 251–268.
Goodman, Nelson. 1983. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University
Press.
Hanson, William H. 1989. Two Kinds of Deviance. History and Philosophy of
Logic, 10(1), 15–28.
Harman, Gilbert. 1986. Change in View. MIT Press.
Hjortland, Ole Thomassen. 2017. Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic. Philo-
sophical Studies, 174(3), 631–658.
Lipton, Peter. 2004. Inference to the Best Explanation. Routledge.
Mares, Edwin. 2014. Belief Revision, Probabilism, and Logic Choice. Review
of Symbolic Logic, 7(4), 647–670.
McGee, Vann. 1985. A Counterexample to Modus Ponens. Journal of Philos-
ophy, 82(9), 462–471.
Australasian Journal of Logic (16:7) 2019, Article no. 7
341
McPherson, Tristram. 2015. The Methodological Irrelevance of Reflective
Equilibrium. Pages 652–674 of: The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical
Methods. Springer.
Meadows, Toby, & Weber, Zach. 2016. Computation in Non-Classical Foun-
dations? Philosophers’ Imprint, 16(13).
Priest, Graham. 2006. Doubt Truth to be a Liar. Clarendon Press Oxford.
Priest, Graham. 2016. Logical Disputes and the a priori. Logique et Analyse,
59(236), 347–366.
Quine, W.V.O. 1970. Philosophy of Logic. Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
Resnik, Michael D. 1997. Mathematics as a Science of Patterns. Clarendon
Press Oxford.
Russell, Gillian. 2014. Metaphysical Analyticity and the Epistemology of
Logic. Philosophical Studies, 171(1), 161–175.
Russell, Gillian. 2015. The Justification of the Basic Laws of Logic. Journal
of Philosophical Logic, 44(6), 793–803.
Russell, Gillian. forthcoming. Deviance and Vice: Strength as a Theoretical
Virtue in The Epistemology Of Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research.
Scanlon, T. M. 2014. Being Realistic About Reasons. Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2000. The Status of Logic. New Essays on the A Priori,
333–366.
Shapiro, Stewart. 2014. Varieties of Logic. Oxford University Press.
Wason, P. C. 1968. Reasoning about a Rule. Quarterly Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology, 20(3), 273–281.
Williamson, Timothy. 2014. Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality. Erkenntnis,
79(2), 211–231.
Woods, Jack. 2018. Mathematics, Morality, and Self-Effacement. Nouˆs, 52(1),
47–68.
Woods, Jack. forthcoming-a. Logical Partisanhood. Philosophical Studies.
Wright, Crispin. 1986. Inventing Logical Necessity. Language, Mind, and
Logic, 187–209.
Australasian Journal of Logic (16:7) 2019, Article no. 7
